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1Learning Equilibria with Partial Information in
Decentralized Wireless Networks
L. Rose, S. M. Perlaza, S. Lasaulce and M. Debbah
Abstract
In this article, a survey of several important equilibrium concepts for decentralized networks is
presented. The term decentralized is used here to refer to scenarios where decisions (e.g., choosing a
power allocation policy) are taken autonomously by devices interacting with each other (e.g., through
mutual interference). The iterative long-term interaction is characterized by stable points of the wireless
network called equilibria. The interest in these equilibria stems from the relevance of network stability
and the fact that they can be achieved by letting radio devices to repeatedly interact over time. To
achieve these equilibria, several learning techniques, namely, the best response dynamics, fictitious play,
smoothed fictitious play, reinforcement learning algorithms, and regret matching, are discussed in terms
of information requirements and convergence properties. Most of the notions introduced here, for both
equilibria and learning schemes, are illustrated by a simple case study, namely, an interference channel
with two transmitter-receiver pairs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of cognitive radio (CR) has gained momentum in recent years to build flexible and efficient
networks. Indeed, CRs are nowadays widely accepted as a suitable solution to rationally exploit shared
spectral resources and increase spectral efficiency. The main idea behind CR relies on the capability of a
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2given radio device to self-configure its own communication parameters in an intelligent, autonomous and
decentralized manner, as a result of its interaction with the environment. In this context, the choice of a
particular communication configuration by a given CR is highly influenced by the choice of all other radio
devices. Within this framework, non-cooperative game theory appears as a suitable paradigm to study
and analyse such scenarios. Therefore, the idea of equilibrium, namely, Nash equilibrium (NE), becomes
particularly relevant. Indeed, at the NE, the transmit configuration of each CR in the network is optimal
with respect to the configuration of all its counterparts. Interestingly, in some cases, an equilibrium can
be reached by using particular iterative procedures similar to learning processes [1].
In this article, we first present an overview of various equilibrium concepts. Later, we introduce a set
of learning algorithms particularly relevant to achieving equilibrium in wireless networks. For each
algorithm, we discuss the required information that each CR must possess at each iteration and the
convergence properties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we briefly present the notations adopted in this
paper, as well as usual game-theoretic terminology. In Sec. III, we present and discuss several important
solution concepts for games, namely, the coarse correlated equilibrium, the correlated equilibrium, the
Nash equilibrium, and the −Nash equilibrium. In Sec. IV, we discuss important learning algorithms
which can, under certain conditions, converge to one of the aforementioned solutions. In Sec. V, we
present an illustrative case study: the 2 × 2 interference channel, a simple, though very important,
communication scenario, which we use as a test-bench for comparing the aforementioned algorithms.
II. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
In game theory, the normal form is a convenient mathematical representation of a game. Basically,
it consists of a triplet: the set of players K = {1, 2, ...,K}, the set of actions Ak = {A(1)k , ..., A(Nk)k },
∀k ∈ K, and the utility functions uk(a), where a ∈ A = A1×A2× ...×AK is an action profile/vector.
With a slight abuse of notation, we denote by a−k ∈ A−k the vector of actions of all players except the
k-th player and we write the vector a as (ak,a−k) to stress the k-th component. For instance, the set
of players can consist of the set of wireless terminals present in the network, the action set can be any
feasible vector of transmit powers, and the utility function can be the spectral efficiency. Other components
are also possible for the game representation and they depend on the scope and purpose of the network
design. We denote by 4 (A) the set of all possible probability distributions over the whole set of actions
A, and by 4(Ak) the set of all possible probability distributions of user k over its action set. We refer to
the elements of the set Ak as actions of player k and those of the set 4(Ak) as strategies of player k. A
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3given strategy of player k is denoted by pik = (pik,A(1)k , ..., pik,A(Nk)k
) ∈ 4 (Ak), where pik,A(nk)k represents
the probability that player k plays action A(nk)K . We indicate by φ = (φA(1) , ..., φA(N)) ∈ 4 (A), with
N =
QK
j=1Nj , a given joint probability distribution over the set A, with φA(n) being the probability of
observing A(n) as an outcome of the game.
III. FROM COARSE CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA TO NASH EQUILIBRIA
The most general type of equilibria we use in this paper is the so called coarse correlated equilibrium
(CCE) [2]. The idea behind CCE is that actions chosen by the players of a game may be correlated. For
instance, correlation may appear when a common broadcast signal is observed by several transmitters
choosing their transmit configuration, e.g., a power control policy. We call the signals received by the
players recommendations. In such a context, a CCE is a probability distribution φ ∈ 4 (A) over the set
of action profiles of the game from which no player has interest in unilaterally deviating. The realizations
of this joint distribution φ are the recommendations. Mathematically, this can be written as follows.
Definition 1 (Coarse Correlated Equilibrium): A joint probability distribution φ ∈ 4 (A) is a CCE if
∀k ∈ K and ∀a′k ∈ Ak it holds that
X
a∈A
uk(a)φa ≥
X
a−k∈A−k
uk(a
′
k,a−k)φ−k,a−k , (1)
where φ−k,a−k =
P
ak∈Ak φ(ak,a−k) is the marginal probability distribution w.r.t. ak.
An important remark is that, following the notion of CCE, players are assumed to decide, before receiving
the recommendation, whether to commit to follow it or not. At a CCE, all players are willing to commit
to follow the recommendation given that all the others also choose to commit. That is, if a single player
decides not to commit to follow the recommendations, it experiences a lower (expected) utility. A special
case of CCE is the correlated equilibrium (CE, [2]). The difference between the CCE and the CE is that,
in the latter, players choose whether to follow or not a given recommendation, after it has been received.
Therefore, there is not a priori commitment. It follows, in particular, that every CE is a CCE [2].
Now, if the players choose their strategy following independent individual probability distributions pik ∈
4 (Ak), i.e., φa =
QK
j=1 pij,aj in (1), we obtain from Def. 1, the definition of mixed Nash equilibrium
(MNE); the MNE is, clearly, a special case of CE and thus, a special case of CCE. A MNE is, therefore,
a vector of individual probability distributions pi = (pi1, . . . ,piK) which is stable to unilateral deviations,
i.e., if player k decides to use a different probability distribution from the corresponding pik, then it
observes a lower (expected) utility. As shown in [3], this type of equilibria always exists in games with
finite number of players and finite action sets. For more results on the existence and multiplicity of NE,
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4the reader is referred to [4]. The finiteness assumption is especially relevant when a wireless terminal has
to select a given communication setting, e.g., a channel, a constellation size, or a transmit power level.
We further introduce the concept of pure NE (PNE). A PNE is obtained by restricting the players to
deterministically choose one of their actions instead of choosing it by following a probability distribution.
A PNE is therefore a special case of MNE where the individual probability distribution is a Dirac delta
function over a given action. Thus, a PNE is a vector of actions a = (a1, . . . , aK) stable to unilateral
deviations, i.e., if player k uses a different action from its corresponding ak, while the others keep their
equilibrium action, player k observes a lower (instantaneous) utility.
As a last notion of equilibrium, we introduce the idea of −equilibrium [2]. An −equilibrium is a
mixed strategy profile pi = (pi1, . . . ,piK) ∈ 4 (A1)× . . .×4 (AK) such that if only one player k uses
a different strategy from its corresponding pik, it does not observe a utility improvement greater than
 > 0. An instance of −NE [2] is the logit equilibrium [2]. In what follows, some learning algorithms
which may converge to CCE, CE, MNE, PNE, or −equilibrium are provided.
IV. LEARNING EQUILIBRIA
The process of learning equilibria is basically an iterative process. Each iteration of the learning process
can be broadly divided into three phases: (i) the observation of the environment at iteration n, which
gives an idea to the players how well they played in the previous iteration; (ii) the improvement of the
strategy pik(n) based on the current observation and (iii) the selection of the action ak(n) according to
the strategy pik(n). Hence, we say that players learn to play an equilibrium, if after a given number of
iterations, the strategy profile pi(n) = (pi1(n), . . . ,piK(n)) ∈ 4 (A1) × . . . ×4 (AK) converges to an
equilibrium strategy.
The purpose of this section and Sec. V is, under the space limitations for this survey, to introduce the
following set of learning algorithms: best response dynamics (BRD), fictitious play (FP), smooth fictitious
play (SFP), regret matching (RM), reinforcement learning (RL) and the joint utility and strategy learning
estimation reinforcement learning (JUSTE-RL). Then, in Sec. IV-B, we compare such algorithms in terms
of relevant features in the context of wireless communications, for instance, type of observations, type
of action sets, convergence time, nature of the steady state achieved when convergence is observed and
conditions for convergence.
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5A. Informal definition of the learning algorithms under consideration
1) Best Response Dynamics: In its most basic form, the best response dynamics relies on the following
assumption: at each game stage n ∈ N, every player k plays the action ak(n) which optimizes its own
utility given the actions played by the other players. When all players play simultaneously at each stage
(simultaneous-BRD), the optimization of player k is done with respect to the action profile a−k(n− 1).
When players play sequentially, only one player at each stage (sequential-BRD) updates its action ak(n),
optimizing it with respect to the action profile (a1(n), . . . , ak−1(n), ak+1(n− 1), . . . , aK(n− 1)).
2) Fictitious Play: The fictitious play relies on the assumption that at each stage n, each player k
knows all the past actions of all the other players, i.e., aj(0), . . . , aj(n−1), ∀j ∈ K\{k}. Based on such
observations, player k calculates the empirical frequencies with which each player plays its corresponding
actions. We refer to these empirical frequencies as beliefs. Let us denote the belief that player k 6= j
has on player j by the vector f j(n) =

fj,A(1)j
(n), . . . , f
j,A
(Nj)
j
(n)

∈ 4 (Aj). At each stage, all players
(simultaneously or sequentially, as in the BRD) choose their current action by optimizing their expected
utility with respect to the beliefs on all the other players, i.e., ak(n) ∈ argmaxak∈AkEf(n) [uk (ak,a−k)],
where f(n) = (f1(n), . . . ,fK(n)).
3) Smooth Fictitious Play (SFP): The convergence of FP is not ensured in games with cycles and its
ability to explore the whole action set is highly constrained. To overcome these issues, a simple variation
of the FP has been proposed under the name of smooth fictitious play (SFP). The assumptions on which
SFP relies are the same as FP and actions can be updated either simultaneously or sequentially. The main
difference between SFP and FP is that, at each stage n, player k does not choose a deterministic action.
It rather builds a probability distribution pik(n) ∈ 4 (Ak) to choose its action ak(n). Such a probability
distribution can be interpreted as the one that maximizes a weighted sum of the original expected utility
and other continuous strictly concave function. For instance, if such a function is the entropy function
[2], the resulting probability distribution is given by the logit probability distribution.
4) Regret Matching (RM): Contrary to the case of BRD, FP and SFP, where players determine whether
to play or not a particular action based on the idea of utility maximization, in RM, such a decision is
made considering the notion of regret minimization. The regret that player k associates with action A(nk)k
is defined as the difference between the average utility the player would have obtained by always playing
A
(nk)
k and the average utility actually achieved with the current strategy, i.e.,
r
k,A
(nk)
k
(n) =
1
n− 1
n−1X
t=1
(uk(A
(nk)
k ,a−k(t))− uk(ak(t),a−k(t))). (2)
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6RM relies on the assumptions that at every stage n, player k is able to both evaluate its own utility,
i.e., to calculate uk(ak(n),a−k(n)) and compute the utility it would have obtained if it had played
any other action a′k, i.e. uk(a
′
k,a−k(n)). Finally, the action to be played at stage n is taken following
the probability distribution pik(n), which is obtained by normalizing to one the regret vector rk(n) =
rk,A(1)k
(n), . . . , r
k,A
(Nk)
k
(n)

.
5) Reinforcement Learning (RL): In the case of reinforcement learning (RL), players are modelled
as automata that implement a given behavioural rule. In general, RL techniques rely on the following
two conditions: (i) for each player k, the action set Ak is finite and for all action profiles a ∈ A, the
achieved utility uk (ak,a−k) is bounded; (ii) each player is able to periodically observe its own achieved
utility. Intuitively, the idea behind CRL is that actions leading to higher utility observations in stage n
are granted with higher probabilities in the game stage n+ 1, and vice versa.
6) Joint Utility and Strategy Estimation based - Reinforcement Learning (JUSTE-RL): A variant of the
former algorithm has been proposed in [5]. The joint utility and strategy estimation behavioural rule relies
on the same assumptions as the classical RL. The main difference between classical RL and JUSTE-RL
is that, in the former, the observation u˜k(n) of the utility of player k is used to directly modify the
probability distribution pik(n); in the latter, such an observation is used to build an estimation of the
expected utility for each of the actions. Such utility estimates are, then, used in the same iteration to
finally build a probability distribution pik(n) from which action ak(n) will be drawn. Thus, each player
always possesses an estimation of the expected utility it obtains by playing each of its actions.
B. Discussion
The purpose of this section is to provide additional insights about the performance and pertinence of the
learning algorithms described above in the context of decentralized wireless networks. In the following,
we compare the algorithms in terms of several fundamental features. We summarize this discussion in
Table I.
1) Observations: At each iteration of a given learning algorithm, each player must obtain some
information about how the other players are reacting to its current action, in order to update their strategy
and choose the following action. Broadly speaking, in algorithms such as BRD, FP, SFP and RM, players
must observe the actions played by all the other players. This implies that a large amount of additional
signaling is required to broadcast such information in wireless networks. In some particular cases, this
condition can be relaxed and less information is required [6], [7]. However, this is highly dependent on
the topology of the network and the explicit form of the utility function [8]. Other algorithms, such as RL
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7and JUSTE-RL, only require that each player observes its corresponding achieved utility at each iteration.
This is in fact, their main advantage, since such information requires a simple feedback message from
the receiver to the corresponding transmitters [9], [5].
2) Knowledge and Calculation Capabilities: Learning algorithms such as BRD, FP, SFP and RM
involve an optimization problem at each iteration [1], that is, either the maximization of the (expected or
instantaneous) utility or minimization of the regret. Therefore, generally, highly demanding calculation
capabilities are required to implement them. More importantly, solving such optimization requires the
knowledge of a closed-form expression of the utility function. This implies that each player knows the
structure of the game, i.e., set of players, action sets, current strategies, channel realizations, etc. In this
respect, RL and JUSTE-RL algorithms are more attractive since only algebraic operations are required
to update the strategies. In terms of knowledge, in both RL and JUSTE-RL, players are only required
to know, at each iteration, the action they actually played and the corresponding achieved utility. Indeed,
one can say that players are not even aware of the presence of other players.
3) Nature of the Action Sets: The nature of the action sets of the game plays an important role.
The BRD can be used for both continuous and discrete action sets, whereas in their standard versions
FP, SFP, RM, CRL, and JUSTE-RL are designed for discrete action sets. For instance, action sets are
discrete in problems where a channel, constellation size or discrete power levels must be selected, whereas
continuous sets are more common in power allocation problems [4].
4) Steady State: When a steady state is achieved by one of the algorithms under consideration, such
state may correspond to one of the equilibrium notions presented in Sec. III. In particular, when BRD and
FP converge, the strategy of the players at the steady state is a NE. In the case of the RM, it converges to
an element of the set of CCE. Here, we highlight the fact that, even though the notion of CCE relies on
the idea of the recommendations studied in Sec. I, it does not require the existence of recommendations to
converge to an element of the set of CCE. When SFP or JUSTE-RL achieve a steady state, it corresponds
to an -NE. On the contrary, in the case of RL, a steady state not necessarily corresponds to a particular
notion of equilibrium.
5) Convergence Conditions: Regarding the conditions for convergence, only sufficient conditions are
available. As shown in Table I, the considered algorithms typically converge in certain classes of games
[2] such as dominance solvable games (DSG), potential games (PG), super-modular games (SMG), 2×N
non-degenerated games (NDG) or zero-sum games (ZSG).
6) Synchronization: In the particular case of algorithms where each player must observe the actions
of the others, e.g., BRD, FP, SFP and RM, certain synchronization is required in order to allow players
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8to know when to play and when to observe the actions of the others. In wireless communications, this
requirement implies the existence of a given protocol for signalling messages exchange. Conversely,
when players require only an observation of their individual utility, such a synchronization between all
the players becomes irrelevant. Here, only a feedback message from the receiver to the corresponding
transmitters per learning iteration is sufficient.
7) Environment: Learning techniques such as the BRD are highly constrained for real system im-
plementations since they require the network to be static during the whole learning processes. On the
contrary, all the other techniques allow the dynamics of the network to be captured by their statistics as
long as they are stationary. This is basically because, contrary to BRD, all the other techniques determine
whether to play or not a particular action based on the expected utility rather than instantaneous utility.
8) Convergence Speed: The speed of convergence (when it is observed) is highly influenced by
the amount of information available for the players. For instance, FP, SFP and RM converge faster
than JUSTE-RL since the formers calculate the expected utility relaying on a closed form expression.
Conversely, the latter calculates it as the time-average of the instantaneous observations of the achieved
utility. This requires a large number of observations to obtain a reliable approximation to the expected
utility. We do not state any particular comment on the speed of convergence of BRD and RL since, in the
former the scenario is considered fixed and the latter, it does not necessarily converge to an equilibrium
strategy. However, conclusions for a particular case are stated in the following section.
V. CASE STUDY: THE PARALLEL INTERFERENCE CHANNEL
In this section, we introduce a simple but insightful example, which we use as a test-bench to compare
the learning algorithms described above. Consider a parallel interference channel, that is, a set of 2
transmitter-receiver pairs sharing a set of S non-overlapping frequency bands. For the ease of presentation,
assume that channel gains are time invariant during the whole transmission duration. Each transmitter
chooses a single frequency band to transmit aiming to maximize its individual spectral efficiency, i.e.,
the ratio between the individual Shannon rate and available bandwidth. This problem has been analysed
in the context of compact and convex sets of actions in [8] and in discrete and finite sets in [10], which
is the case of this section.
In Figure 1, we plot the average spectral efficiency of the system as a function of the SNR, in the
case where only 2 orthogonal channels are available. Here, all the algorithms iterate the same number
of times (40 iterations). In Figure 1, it is interesting to note how algorithms such as FP, SFP and RM
converge always very close to the best NE, i.e, the NE associated with the highest network spectral
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9efficiency. Nonetheless, this performance is achieved at the cost of a lot of information about the game.
In particular, note that RL and JUSTE-RL are less performing, but at the same time, less demanding in
terms of information. Interestingly, the BRD demands the same information assumptions than FP, SFP
and RM. However, the performance is even worse that RL. This is due to the fact that BRD does not
necessarily converge to a NE in this particular game. In Figure 2, we plot the network spectral efficiency
of the algorithms as a function of the number of iterations for the case of two channels. Here, RM and
BRD appear to be the best performing and worst performing algorithms, respectively. With respect to
the BRD, such a performance is due to a ping-pong effect between two particular action profiles. In
detail, since players are simultaneously selecting the channels with the highest gain, it may happen that
the best channel is the same for both players. Thus, for instance, at odd iterations they both share the
same channel and in the next one, they both select different channels. This effect will continue at the
infinite preventing the algorithm to converge. In Figure 3, we show how the algorithms perform when
a higher number of channels is available, i.e, 4 channels. BRD improves its performance, with respect
to the other algorithms. This is mainly because the higher number of channel reduces the probability of
the ping-pong effect described above.
In Figure 4, we plot the network spectral efficiency as a function of the number of available channels. Here,
the negative slot is due to the fact that we increase the number of available channels but transmitters
remain subject to use a single channel. Thus, since S > K, there always exist a number of unused
channels. The main observation in this figure is the following, the BRD becomes a very efficient solution
when the number of channels is high enough to make the bouncing effect a very improbable event.
Conversely, JUSTE-RL exhibits a lower performance when the number of possible actions increases.
This is basically because, in JUSTE, all players play all their actions with non-zero probability in order
to improve their utility estimation. Thus, this immediately implies that increasing the number of actions,
increases the time that players are playing actions different from the optimal actions.
Finally, in Figure 5, we show for the 2-players 2-channel case, the trajectories of the algorithm during
the transient phase. In this realization, BRD it can be observed that BRD does not converge. The
two transmitters repeatedly select synchronously the same channel. FP and SFP converge to the best
performing NE while CRL converges fast to a steady point with no game theoretical meaning. In the
trajectory of JUSTE, it is possible to see that it converges to the best performing NE, for that particular
channel realization. Similarly, RM also converge very fast to the best NE.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented several notions of equilibrium and several learning dynamics that
allow wireless networks to achieve such equilibria. In particular, we have described a general notion
of equilibrium, namely, the coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE). Then, we introduced some particular
cases of CCE, such as correlated equilibrium (CE) and Nash equilibrium (NE), are also analysed.
Regarding the learning dynamics, we have presented the best response dynamics (BRD), fictitious play
(FP), smooth fictitious play (SFP), regret matching (RM), reinforcement learning (RL) and joint utility
and strategy estimation based reinforcement learning (JUSTE-RL). We have identified the pertinence of
these algorithms for wireless communications in terms of system constraints (continuous/discrete actions,
required information, synchronization, signalling, etc.) and the performance criteria (utility achieved at
the steady state, convergence speed, etc.). As further work in this direction, we point out that existing
results regarding the analysis of equilibrium in wireless networks strongly depend on the topology of
the network. Indeed, a general framework for the analysis of equilibria and learning dynamics adapted
to time-varying topology networks is still an open problem. Moreover, we must consider that some
equilibrium notions, e.g., NE and -NE, might be inefficient from a global point of view. Thus, learning
algorithms to achieve Pareto optimal solutions with partial information is a further direction of research.
REFERENCES
[1] D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine, The Theory of Learning in Games, ser. MIT Press Books. The MIT Press, 1998, vol. 1,
no. 0262061945.
[2] H. P. Young, “Strategic learning and its limits (arne ryde memorial lectures sereis),” Oxford University Press, USA, 2004.
[3] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, “Game theory,” MIT Press, 1991.
[4] S. Lasaulce, M. Debbah, and E. Altman, “Methodologies for analyzing equilibria in wireless games,” IEEE Signal
Processing Magazine, Special issue on Game Theory for Signal Processing, vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 41–52, Sep. 2009.
[5] S. M. Perlaza, H. Tembine, and S. Lasaulce, “How can ignorant but patient cognitive terminals learn their strategy and
utility?” in the 11th IEEE Intl. Workshop on Signal Processing Advances in Wireless Communications (SPAWC 2010),
Marrakech, Morocco, June 2010.
[6] E. G. Larsson, E. A. Jorswieck, J. Lindblom, and R. Mochaourab, “Game Theory and the Flat-Fading Gaussian Interference
Channel: Analyzing Resource Conflicts in Wireless Networks,” IEEE signal processing magazine (Print), vol. 26, no. 5,
pp. 18–27, 2009.
[7] A. Leshem and E. Zehavi, “Game theory and the frequency selective interference channel - a tutorial,” IEEE Signal
Processing Magazine, vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 28–40, 2009. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/0903.2174
[8] G. Scutari, D. Palomar, and S. Barbarossa, “Optimal linear precoding strategies for wideband non-cooperative systems
based on game theory – part II: Algorithms,” IEEE Trans. on Signal Processing, vol. 56, no. 3, pp. 1250–1267, mar. 2008.
June 2, 2011 DRAFT
11
[9] P. Sastry, V. Phansalkar, and M. Thathachar, “Decentralized learning of Nash equilibria in multi-person stochastic games
with incomplete information,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 769–777, May
1994.
[10] L. Rose, S. M. Perlaza, and M. Debbah, “On the Nash equilibria in decentralized parallel interference channels,” in IEEE
Workshop on Game Theory and Resource Allocation for 4G, Kyoto, Japan, Jun. 2011.
June 2, 2011 DRAFT
12
Fig. 1. Average system spectral efficiency [bps/Hz] as a function of signal to noise ratio (SNR) with 40 iterations for the 2
players and 2 channel case.
BRD FP SFP RM RL JUSTE-RL
Observations a−k(t) a−k(t) a−k(t) a−k(t) u˜k(t) u˜k(t)
Closed Expression for uk Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Computation complexity Optimization Optimization Optimization Optimization Algebraic Operation Algebraic Operation
Steady State NE NE -NE CCE −− -NE
Condition for Convergence DSG,PG, SMG DSG, PG, ZSG, 2×N -NDG DSG,PG,ZSG NDG −− DSG, 2−player ZSG, PG
Synchronization to Play Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Environment Static Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary
TABLE I
BENCHMARK OF LEARNING ALGORITHMS.
June 2, 2011 DRAFT
13
Fig. 2. Average system spectral efficiency [bps/Hz] as a function of the number of iterations at a fixed SNR of 10 dB for the
2 players and 2 channel case.
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Fig. 3. Average system spectral efficiency [bps/Hz] as a function of the number of iterations at a fixed SNR of 10 dB for the
2 players and 4 channel case.
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Fig. 4. Average system spectral efficiency as a function of the number of channels, with SNR=10dB and 40 iterations.
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Fig. 5. Example of trajectories. BRD bounces between unstable solution; FP and SFP converge close to the best NE; CRL
converges to a low performing NE, JUSTE-RL converges close to the best NE, RM converges close to the best NE
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